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STEVEN P. MARTIN AND SANGEETA PARASHAR University of Maryland
Women’s Changing Attitudes Toward Divorce,
1974–2002: Evidence for an Educational Crossover
This article examines trends in divorce attitudes
of young adult women in the United States by
educational attainment from 1974 to 2002.
Women with 4-year college degrees, who previ-
ously had the most permissive attitudes toward
divorce, have become more restrictive in their
attitudes toward divorce than high school grad-
uates and women with some college education,
whereas women with no high school diplomas
have increasingly permissive attitudes toward
divorce. We examine this educational crossover
in divorce attitudes in the context of variables
correlated with women’s educational attain-
ment, including family attitudes and religion,
income and occupational prestige, and family
structure. We conclude that the educational
crossover in divorce attitudes is associated
most strongly with work and family structure
variables.
The spread of nontraditional family values in
the United States has slowed since the 1970s,
and some observers now argue that a shift back
to conservative attitudes is under way, portend-
ing significant change in family behaviors and
outcomes. Blankenhorn (2002) summarizes this
trend by asserting that:
(O)n the core social question of whether family
fragmentation is a bad thing or a not-so-bad
thing, a steady shift in popular and (especially)
elite opinion took place over the course of the
1990s. Denial and happy talk about the conse-
quences of nuclear family decline became decid-
edly less widespread; concern and even alarm
became much more common. As a society we
changed our minds, and as a result we changed
some of our laws. And now, it seems, we are
beginning to change some of our personal behav-
ior. This is very encouraging news.
Blankenhorn’s argument is particularly salient
in light of growing evidence of class differences
in family fragmentation. Two-parent families
remain the norm among highly educated cou-
ples but are increasingly uncommon among less
educated couples (McLanahan, 2004). Since
the 1970s, marital and union dissolution rates
(Raley & Bumpass, 2003) have diverged by
women’s educational attainment, as has the
prevalence of divorce among mothers (Elwood
& Jencks, 2004). If attitudes toward divorce
diverged across women’s educational levels at
the same time as divorce behaviors were diverg-
ing, then such a pattern might help researchers
and policymakers understand divergence in
family outcomes.
No previous studies have looked for growing
class differences in attitudes toward divorce.
Overall, divorce attitudes have stabilized in recent
decades after a period of liberalization (Axinn
& Thornton, 2000; Thornton & Young-DeMarco,
2001), but no studies have studied trends for
separate educational groups. Also, the causal
relationships between divorce attitudes and
divorce behavior are not clear. There is evi-
dence that divorce attitudes can affect marital
behavior as Blankenhorn suggested (Amato &
Rogers, 1999), but the causal relationships
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between family attitudes and behavior can be
complex and endogenous (Rindfuss, Brewster,
& Kavee, 1996).
This analysis has two parts. In the first part,
we determine whether women’s attitudes to-
ward divorce are indeed diverging by educa-
tional attainment. In the second part, we use a
multivariate analysis to identify variables for
social values, women’s work, and family struc-
ture that correlate with educational trends in
attitudes toward divorce. We avoid drawing con-
clusive causal inferences from the multivariate
analysis, but we offer arguments about the ex-
tent to which attitudes toward divorce might
be independent of variables linked to divorce
behavior.
Trends in Education and
Attitudes Toward Divorce
An analysis of trends in education and attitudes
toward divorce faces some initial difficulties.
The overall level of educational attainment has
changed in recent decades, as have divorce rates
and laws governing divorce. Under certain con-
ditions, an observed educational crossover in
divorce attitudes could simply be an artifact of
these trends.
College graduates increase from year to year
as a percent of women in each survey sample.
This trend could produce a spurious pattern of
increasingly restrictive attitudes toward divorce
among college graduates and less restrictive at-
titudes among nongraduates. If attitudes toward
divorce have a humped distribution across edu-
cational levels with the least restrictive attitudes
at both ends and the most restrictive attitudes in
the center of the distribution, then we would
expect increasingly restrictive attitudes toward
divorce among college graduates as they take
up more of the conservative middle of the edu-
cation distribution. To determine whether such
a problem exists, we supplement an analysis of
attitudes by educational level with an analysis
by educational percentile.
Across the survey years of this analysis,
divorce rates rose, then declined, and laws gov-
erning divorce changed as states passed no-fault
divorce laws. The General Social Survey (GSS)
asks respondents whether divorce should be
easier or more difficult to obtain. Overall trends
in responses therefore reflect changes in divorce
laws as well as changes in people’s attitudes
toward those laws. It is unclear whether changes
in divorce laws might affect the attitudes of
some educational groups more than others. To
address this problem, we briefly refer to sensi-
tivity analyses that restrict the time span to more
recent years when divorce rates and divorce
laws have been relatively constant.
Interpreting Trends in Attitudes
One way to interpret an educational divergence
in attitudes toward divorce would be as a shift
in value orientations of educated women toward
family solidarity and away from individualistic
beliefs that underscore freedom and autonomy.
Such an interpretation has some support. Col-
lege graduates have historically been more lib-
eral than individuals of other educational levels,
but this pattern has recently diminished or dis-
appeared for several family-related attitudes
such as gender ideologies (Brewster & Padavic,
2000) and nonmarital sex (Treas, 2002).
A lagged diffusion of family values could
produce conservative shifts in value orientation
among highly educated women relative to other
women. College graduates have historically
adopted new attitudes and behaviors that dif-
fused to individuals of other education levels
(Sorokin, 1947). Given evidence that the liber-
alizing trend in American attitudes is indeed
slowing down or stopping (Harris & Firestone,
1998), it is arguable that the highly educated
have completed their transition toward liberal-
ization, whereas the less educated groups are
catching up. Furthermore, family attitudes do
not always move toward greater individual
freedom but may ebb and flow across time
periods (Lestaeghe & Surkyn, 1988). College
graduates may be beginning to adopt more
conservative family attitudes even as less edu-
cated individuals are still moving toward more
liberal attitudes.
In a broader context of social values, college
has been a place for liberal thinking (e.g., anti-
Vietnam protest in the 1960s) encouraged by
a progressive faculty (Alwin, Cohen, & New-
comb, 1991). As tuition and the earnings premi-
ums of education have increased in recent
decades, however, it is arguable that students
may be attending college for more economic
reasons, pursuing job-oriented majors, and
experiencing fewer liberalizing influences.
An alternative interpretation of educational
trends in divorce attitudes would emphasize
social structures over social values. In this
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interpretation, we begin with a rational choice
perspective that a woman’s expected utility of
divorce affects her decisions about divorce and
we conjecture that her expected utility of
divorce also affects her attitude toward the
accessibility of divorce.
College graduate women typically have high
incomes and labor force participation rates
(Blau, 1998). Analyses of family change
informed by the new home economics of Becker
(1981) and others have focused on women’s
growing economic independence, which might
predispose women with high incomes to want
to preserve the option to divorce in case the
need should arise. By this argument, highly
educated women should have the most permis-
sive attitudes toward divorce. Recent studies,
however, indicate that women’s incomes im-
prove the quality of marriages and the gains to
staying married (Rogers & DeBoer, 1999; Sayer
& Bianchi, 2000; Schoen, Astone, Rothert,
Standish, & Kim, 2002) and presumably lower
the salience of divorce for groups of women
with the highest earning power.
High incomes for women also increasingly
predict a high likelihood of marrying (Sweeney,
2002) perhaps because more men now view
earning potential as a desirable characteristic of
a marriage partner. Women with high earning
potential can be increasingly selective about
marriage partners and can presumably also pro-
long their marriage searches (Oppenheimer,
1994). In contrast, women with lower educa-
tional attainment and lower earning potential
face high levels of uncertainty about the eco-
nomic prospects and economic stability of
young adult men (Oppenheimer, Kalmijn, &
Lim, 1997; Wilson, 1987).
An argument from the expected utility of
divorce can be applied to family structure as
well as income and earning potential. Women
whose current family patterns entail consider-
able uncertainty about their future probability of
divorce should have the most permissive atti-
tudes toward divorce. This may be particularly
true for single mothers, who are often strongly
motivated to marry to support their children, yet
who might have difficulty entering a marriage
because men are often reluctant to marry
women who already have children (Lichter &
Graefe, 2001; Upchurch, Lillard, & Panis,
2001). Most of the increase in single-mother
families in recent decades has been among
women of lower educational attainment
(Elwood & Jencks, 2004; McLanahan, 2004),
so shifts in family structure could also be con-
tributing to an educational divergence in atti-
tudes toward divorce.
Note that a high expected utility of divorce is
not incompatible with a strong willingness to
marry. A woman might face expected gains
from marriage (averaged across all possible
futures) that are less than zero but may still
choose to marry if some part of the distribution
of possible futures for the marriage has gains
that exceed zero, and if she has access to
divorce in case the marriage does not work out
as hoped.
We now have two distinct frameworks—
one based on the diffusion of values and the
other based on the changing expected utility of
divorce—both of which predict an educational
crossover in divorce attitudes. To evaluate these
two possible frameworks, we turn to the rich set
of demographic, social, economic, and attitudi-
nal measures that are available in the GSS’s
three decades of reports of social attitudes.
METHOD
Data
The GSS, conducted annually or biennially by
the National Opinion Research Center, is a use-
ful data set for examining trends in social atti-
tudes because of its large sample size and long
time series. It is a face-to-face survey of the
English-speaking population aged 18 and older
in the United States. To best capture trends in
the attitudes of successive cohorts, we restrict
the sample to young adult respondents of age
25–39 (N ¼ 4,999 women). In sensitivity analy-
ses, we used different age restrictions with no
effect on the substantive results.
Our measure of attitudes toward divorce is
the single question ‘‘Should divorce in this
country be easier or more difficult to obtain than
it is now?’’ This question was asked in most of
the survey years from 1974 to 2002. The three
categories of valid answers were easier, stay the
same (volunteered by 20% of respondents), and
more difficult.
We code three categories for educational
attainment at interview: no high school di-
ploma, high school diploma (including some
college and General Equivalency Diploma;
GED), and 4-year college degree or more.
Splitting these groups to create categories for
Women’s Changing Attitudes Toward Divorce 31
some college and for master’s or professional
degree did not affect our substantive results.
Regression models include demographic con-
trols for 5-year age groups, race, and nativity of
the respondent.
In addition to demographic controls, the sta-
tistical models include variables to control for
important social trends that might be related to
shifts in attitudes toward divorce. As we previ-
ously discussed, these social trends include var-
iables for social values, women’s income and
labor force participation, and family structure.
As one measure of social values, we con-
struct a traditional gender ideology scale from
three statements that measure the respondents’
agreement with statements about working moth-
ers. The three statements are the following: ‘‘A
preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her
mother works,’’ ‘‘It is much better for everyone
involved if the man is the achiever outside the
home and the woman takes care of the home
and family,’’ and ‘‘A working mother can estab-
lish just as warm and secure a relationship with
her children as a mother who does not work.’’
Each statement has four possible responses
(from strongly disagree to strongly agree),
which we combine into an overall scale of 0–9,
with 9 being the most traditional attitudes
toward working mothers. Brewster and Padavic
(2000) provide a more detailed discussion of
these and other measures of gender ideology.
Scores for the gender ideology variables are not
available for some survey years; for these and
other variables, we use imputation flags for
missing observations.
Other variables provide a broader measure of
social attitudes. One such variable is conserva-
tive political views, in which the respondent is
asked to place herself on a 7-point scale from
extremely liberal (0) to extremely conservative
(6). Other variables include level of church atten-
dance transformed into number of times per
month the respondent attends religious services
(for a discussion of this variable, see Call &
Heaton, 1997) and a recoded measure provided
by the GSS that assigns respondents’ religious
denominations to a three-level fundamentalism
scale: fundamentalist, moderate, or liberal. The
GSS also includes variables for attitudes toward
extramarital and premarital sex, with four possi-
ble responses for each variable ranging from not
wrong at all (0) to always wrong (3).
Variables for women’s income and labor
force involvement include a dichotomous vari-
able for whether the respondent received any
income in the past year, respondent’s income
in 1982–1984 constant dollars (respondents
in open-ended income categories were scored
at 150% of the base income for that cate-
gory), and respondent’s occupational prestige
score. Occupational prestige is scored on
whether the respondent was currently work-
ing and whether the respondent previously
held a job for 1 year or more (for a detailed
discussion of occupational prestige scoring in
the GSS, see Nakao, Hodge, & Treas, 1990).
Occupational prestige is a particularly useful so-
cioeconomic measure for young adult women,
whose current incomes may not reflect their
long-term earning potential, and who may
often be outside of the labor force at the time
of interview because of childbearing or other
reasons.
Family structure variables include dichoto-
mous categories for individuals who are never
married and childless; never married, with
children; married and childless; married, with
children; and separated/divorced. Separated/
divorced women are not distinguished by
parenthood status because few separated and
divorced women are childless at interview.
Widows are grouped with the small number of
cases with missing information. A model using
divorce as a predictor of attitudes toward di-
vorce clearly raises concerns about reverse cau-
sality, but models without a dichotomous
variable for divorce produced substantively
equivalent results.
For the regression analysis of attitudes
toward divorce, we use an ordered logit model
of the level of restrictiveness in a respondent’s
attitudes toward divorce. We score level 0 ¼
easier, 1 ¼ stay the same, and 2 ¼ harder. The
ordered logit coefficients reflect the change
in the log odds that a predicted response will
be one level higher, given a unit increase in
an explanatory variable with all other explana-
tory variables held constant. All statistical
models include flags for missing values on
each variable, but we do not show the co-
efficients for missing value flags. In the
statistical analysis, we use unweighted
scores. Robust ordinal logit procedures using
weighted scores give substantively equivalent
results. For the descriptive cross-tabulations
and figures, we use scores weighted by post-
stratification weight and the number of adults
in the household.
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RESULTS
Divergence in Attitudes Toward Divorce
Figure 1A shows clear evidence for educational
divergence in attitudes toward divorce. In the
1970s, of all education groups of U.S. women
aged 25–39, 4-year college graduates had the
least restrictive attitudes toward divorce. By the
2000 and 2002 interviews, 4-year college grad-
uates had the most restrictive attitudes. At the
other end of the educational continuum, women
with no high school diploma have moved from
being essentially neutral to having the least
restrictive attitudes toward divorce.
College graduates increase as a percent of the
sample, from 16% in 1974–1978 to 26% in
1998–2002. To determine whether this shift in
educational attainment distorted the observed
results, we converted respondents’ years of com-
pleted education into percentile scores. The re-
sults, shown in Figure 1B, indicate that shifts in
educational attainment do not explain the edu-
cational crossover in divorce attitudes.
Along with overall education levels, state
divorce laws also changed across the time span
of this analysis in ways that could distort the re-
sults. We repeated all descriptive and multivari-
ate analyses restricting the span of years to
1985 and later (by which time 49 states had
passed no-fault divorce laws) and to surveys
after 1991 (when Arkansas became the final
state to enact no-fault divorce). The results,
available on request, were substantively the
same as those for the entire time series but with
larger standard errors.
Multivariate Analyses
Descriptive statistics in Table 1 show how
social values, income and occupational prestige,
and family structure have changed across the
time span of this study. The variables that mea-
sure social values, such as attitudes toward
women’s work roles, extramarital sex, and reli-
gious involvement, generally moved in a tradi-
tional or conservative direction for college
graduate women. For women with no 4-year
college degree, each measure showed less of a
movement toward traditional values or some
movement toward liberal values. Hence, the
educational crossover in divorce attitudes was
concurrent with an educational convergence or
crossover in a number of variables measuring
social values, although the crossover in divorce
attitudes appears to have been more pronounced
than the other shifts in social values.
The middle and lower rows of Table 1 show
descriptive statistics for variables for women’s
work and family structure. Throughout the time
period of the study, women with a 4-year col-
lege degree reported higher levels of labor force
activity, higher incomes, and higher occupa-
tional prestige than women with no 4-year col-
lege degree. Labor force involvement, income,
and occupational prestige have generally
increased for all women throughout the time
period. Among measures of family structure,
the proportion married with children declined
FIGURE 1. (A) RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION: ‘‘SHOULD
DIVORCE BE EASIER OR MORE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN
THAN IT IS NOW?’’ BY EDUCATION AND DECADE FOR
U.S. WOMEN AGED 25–39. (B) RESPONSES TO THE QUES-
TION: ‘‘SHOULD DIVORCE BE EASIER OR MORE DIFFI-
CULT TO OBTAIN THAN IT IS NOW?’’ BY SELECTED
DECADES AND YEARS OF EDUCATION EXPRESSED AS
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Note: Source: GSS 1974–2002. N ¼ 4,999. Scoring: 0 ¼
easier, 1 ¼ stay the same, 2 ¼ more difficult. Averages are
based on weighted scores.
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for all women but most dramatically for women
with no 4-year college degree (from 74% to
47%). Women with no 4-year college degree
had the sharpest increases in the most nontradi-
tional family categories: never-married women,
with children (from 2% to 16%) and divorced
or separated (from 11% to 18%).
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the
variables in the main statistical analysis.
Table 3 shows results from ordinal logistic
regression models of attitudes toward divorce,
where positive coefficients reflect a higher pro-
portion of responses that divorce should be
more difficult to obtain. The education 3 year
coefficients (in the fourth and fifth rows of
each model) measure the educational crossover
in divorce attitudes that comprises the main
finding of this study.
Model A is the simplest multivariate model.
It includes main effects of education, trend ef-
fects of education, and demographic controls
for age, race, and nativity. The 4-year college
graduate 3 year coefficient (10.034) reflects a
statistically significant yearly increase in restric-
tive attitudes toward divorce for 4-year college
graduates relative to the omitted educational
group (high school graduates or women with
some college) after 1974. The no high school
diploma 3 year coefficient (0.034) confirms
that women with no high school diploma have
increasingly reported less restrictive attitudes
toward divorce compared to women with a high
school diploma or some college. The main coef-
ficient for 4-year college degree (0.48) indi-
cates that, as of the year 1974, 4-year college
graduates had less restrictive attitudes toward
divorce than high school graduates.
Model B in Table 3 includes variables for
social values—political views, gender ideology,
and religious involvement—plus a trend (year)
interaction for each variable. The education 3
year interaction coefficients remain large and
statistically significant in Model B (at 0.027 and
0.030), though somewhat smaller than the
corresponding coefficients in Model A. The dif-
ference between the education 3 year coeffi-
cients in Model B and the coefficients in Model
A reflects the portion of the educational
TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS FOR WOMEN AGED 25–39, BY EDUCATION AND YEAR
Four-Year College Degree No Four-Year College Degree
Survey Years Survey Years
1974–1978 1998–2002 1974–1978 1998–2002
Variables for social values
Mean traditional gender ideology (0–9) 2.9 2.9 4.5 3.6
Disapproval of premarital sex (0–3) 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.1
Disapproval of extramarital sex (0–3) 2.2 2.8 2.5 2.7
Level of religious fundamentalism (0–2) 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.2
Times per month attending religious services 2.2 2.2 2.0 1.7
Conservative political views (0–6) 2.6 3.1 2.9 3.0
Income and occupational prestige
Percent reporting any income 73 88 54 75
Median income for those reporting
any income (in 1982–1984 constant
dollars 3 1000)
14.1 20.4 9.3 11.0
Mean occupational prestige score 54 54 36 40
Family structure variables (%)
Never married and childless 18 25 5 12
Never married, with children 0 3 2 16
Married and childless 23 17 6 7
Married, with children 75 62 80 53
Divorced or separated 6 9 11 18
Widowed 1 0 1 2
Note: GSSs for 1974–1978, 1998, 2000, and 2002. Total N ¼ 4,999. Averages are based on weighted scores.
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crossover in divorce attitudes that is predicted
by shifts in variables for social values.
Statistically significant main coefficients for
most social values variables in Model B indicate
that traditional value orientations and religious
involvement were strong predictors of restric-
tive attitudes toward divorce in the 1970s. For
example, the coefficient for times per month
attending religious services is 10.19, suggest-
ing that (all else equal) for each time per month
a woman attended church, her predicted odds of
reporting a more restrictive attitude toward
divorce increased by exp(0.19) or about 1.21
times. The year interactions for most social val-
ues variables, however, have negative signs.
For example, the coefficient for Times per
Month Attending Religious Services 3 Year is
0.004, indicating that the relationship between
TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE SAMPLE OF WOMEN AGED 25–39
M SD
Attitudes toward divorce
Should be more difficult to obtain 0.46 —
Stay the same 0.22 —
Should be easier to obtain 0.32 —
Education level at interview
Four-year college degree 0.22 —
High school diploma (includes some college) 0.64 —
No high school diploma 0.14 —










Foreign born 0.06 —
Social values variables
Traditional gender ideology (0–9) 3.2 2.0
Disapproval of premarital sex (0–3) 1.0 1.1
Disapproval of extramarital sex (0–3) 2.6 0.5
Fundamentalist religion 0.33 —
Moderate religion 0.43 —
Liberal/no religion 0.21 —
Times per month attending religious services 1.9 2.1
Work and income variables
No reported income 0.29 —
Income of those with income (1982–1984 constant dollars) $12,300 (9,500)
Occupational prestige score (0–86) 39.0 16.9
Family structure variables
Never married, childless 0.12 —
Never married, with children 0.07 —
Married, childless 0.09 —
Married, with children 0.51 —
Separated or divorced 0.20 —
Note: GSSs for 1974–2002. N ¼ 4,999.
Women’s Changing Attitudes Toward Divorce 35
TABLE 3. ORDINAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL FOR ATTITUDES THAT DIVORCE SHOULD BE MORE
DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN; U.S. WOMEN AGED 25–39 AT INTERVIEW IN 1974–2002
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Year (main effect) 0.011 (0.007) 0.032 (0.022) 0.009 (0.012) 0 .028 (0.025)
Four-year college degree 0.48** (0.13) 0.28 (0.14) 0.27 (0.15) 0.12 (0.16)
No high school diploma 0.10 (0.13) 0.14 (0.14) 0.19 (0.14) 0.20 (0.15)
Four-Year College Degree 3 Year 0.034** (0.008) 0.027** (0.009) 0.017 (0.009) 0.009 (0.010)
No High School Diploma 3 Year 0.034** (0.010) 0.030** (0.010) 0.024* (0.010) 0.020 (0.011)
Social values variables
Traditional gender ideology (0–9) 0.01 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05)
Disapproval of premarital sex (0–3) 0.39** (0.06) 0.36** (0.06)
Disapproval of extramarital sex (0–3) 0.39** (0.08) 0.37** (0.08)
Level of religious fundamentalism (0–2) 0.28** (0.08) 0.29** (0.08)
Times per month attending religious services 0.19** (0.03) 0.19** (0.03)
Conservative political views (0–6) 0.12* (0.05) 0.11* (0.05)
Traditional Gender Ideology Score 3 Year 0.004 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003)
Disapproval of Premarital Sex 3 Year 0.006 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004)
Disapproval of Extramarital Sex 3 Year 0.003 (0.006) 0.001 (0.007)
Fundamentalism 3 Year 0.017** (0.005) 0.016** (0.005)
Times per Month Attending Religious
Services 3 Year
0.004* (0.002) 0.005* (0.002)
Conservative Political Views 3 Year 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)
Work and family structure variables
Any paid work in past year (1 ¼ yes, 0 ¼ no) 0.19 (0.14) 0.23 (0.14)
Occupational prestige score/10 (0.0–8.6) 0.06 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04)
Yearly income/10,000 0.13 (0.08) 0.05 (0.08)
Never married, childless 0.48* (0.19) 0.30 (0.20)
Married, childless 0.47* (0.19) 0.39* (0.20)
Never married, with children 0.54 (0.30) 0.05 (0.31)
Separated/divorced 0.81** (0.14) 0.45** (0.15)
Any Paid Work 3 Year 0.020* (0.009) 0.018* (0.009)
Occupational Prestige Score 3 Year 0.006* (0.002) 0.006* (0.002)
Income 3 Year 0.006 (0.004) 0.004 (0.005)
Never Married, Childless 3 Year 0.003 (0.011) 0.007 (0.012)
Married, Childless 3 Year 0.007 (0.012) 0.011 (0.013)
Never Married, With Children 3 Year 0.023 (0.016) 0.043** (0.016)
Separated/Divorced 3 Year 0.006 (0.009) 0.016 (0.009)
Demographic controls
Age ¼ 30–34 0.19 (0.12) 0.05 (0.12) 0.13 (0.12) 0.03 (0.13)
Age ¼ 35–39 0.33** (0.12) 0.01 (0.13) 0.29* (0.13) 0.01 (0.14)
Black 1.37** (0.15) 1.53** (0.17) 1.24** (0.16) 1.54** (0.17)
Other non-White 0.41 (0.42) 0.73 (0.43) 0.49 (0.42) 0.79 (0.44)
Foreign born 0.11 (0.28) 0.01 (0.30) 0.14 (0.28) 0.03 (0.30)
Age 30–34 3 Year 0.012 (0.008) 0.005 (0.008) 0.012 (0.008) 0.005 (0.008)
Age 35–39 3 Year 0.012 (0.008) 0.001 (0.008) 0.014 (0.008) 0.000 (0.009)
Black 3 Year 0.013 (0.010) 0.011 (0.010) 0.019 (0.010) 0.022* (0.011)
Other Non-White 3 Year 0.004 (0.022) 0.007 (0.022) 0.004 (0.022) 0.014 (0.023)
Foreign Born 3 Year 0.012 (0.016) 0.001 (0.016) 0.010 (0.016) 0.001 (0.016)
Cutpoint 1 0.84 (0.11) 1.29 (0.32) 1.28 (0.20) 1.00 (0.38)
Cutpoint 2 0.13 (0.11) 2.35 (0.32) 0.28 (0.20) 2.08 (0.38)
Log likelihood 5091.2 4786.8 4987.5 4727.6
Note: GSSs for 1974–2002. N ¼ 4,999. Scoring for dependent variable: divorce in the United States should be easier to obtain ¼ 0;
stay the same ¼ 1; harder to obtain ¼ 2. Omitted categories are year ¼ 1974; education ¼ high school graduate or some college;
age ¼ 25–29; race ¼ non-Hispanic White; family structure ¼ married, with children. Control for widowed status is also not shown.
*p , .05. **p , .01.
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attitudes toward divorce and attendance of reli-
gious services has weakened over time. Hence,
college graduates are reporting more socially
traditional values compared to other women,
but such a pattern has less effect on divorce atti-
tudes than it might have in the past.
Model C replaces the variables for social val-
ues with variables for women’s work status and
family structure. The Education 3 Year interac-
tion coefficients retain the same signs as in
Models A and B (at 0.017 and 0.024) but are
considerably reduced and have lost some statis-
tical significance. Hence, a relatively large por-
tion of the educational crossover in divorce
attitudes is predicted by shifts in variables for
women’s work and family structure. This find-
ing is somewhat surprising, given that the work
variables in Model C have lower levels of statis-
tical significance than the social values varia-
bles in Model B, and given that the statistically
significant family structure variables in Model
C are dichotomous variables that apply only to
a small proportion of the sample.
Finally, Model D includes all explanatory
variables. The Education 3 Year interaction co-
efficients are no longer statistically significant
in Model D (at 0.009 and 0.020), though the
signs of the coefficients suggest that some part
of the educational crossover in divorce attitudes
is not explained by the variables in this model.
One possible explanation for this residual edu-
cational trend is a shift in divorce attitudes pred-
icated on information about divorce rather than
social values in general. Highly educated
women might learn about the negative conse-
quences of divorce before other women and
might adjust their attitudes first in response to
this information. Unfortunately, this hypothesis
is impossible to test directly because we have no
information on women’s knowledge of the con-
sequences of divorce. Our general finding of the
strongest educational differences in the 2000–
2002 sample, however, indicates that such a dif-
fusion of information is quite slow in spreading
across educational levels, if it is occurring.
In sensitivity analyses, we examined the vari-
ables in the multivariate models one by one and
found the occupational prestige and never mar-
ried, with children variables to be particularly
important contributors to the overall educational
trends in attitudes toward divorce. For both of
these variables, we found increasingly disparate
distributions of the variable between college grad-
uates and other women, along with increasing
correspondence over time between scores on
the variables and attitudes toward divorce. In
other words, highly educated women have high
occupational prestige and low proportions of
never-married motherhood, factors that increas-
ingly predict restrictive attitudes toward divorce,
whereas less educated women have declining
occupational prestige and rising levels of never-
married motherhood, factors that increasingly
predict permissive attitudes toward divorce.
Note also the negative coefficients for Any Paid
Work 3 Year in Models C and D (0.020 and
0.018, respectively) imply that women who
do no paid work also have increasingly restric-
tive attitudes toward divorce, leaving working
women with low incomes and low occupational
prestige as the group with the most permissive
attitudes toward divorce.
We can compare the Education 3 Year coef-
ficients in Model A to the corresponding coeffi-
cients in Models B, C, and D to see how much
each set of variables explains the educational
crossover in divorce attitudes. The result of this
exercise is shown in Table 4. These results sug-
gest that work, occupational prestige, and fam-
ily structure are more important factors driving
educational shifts in divorce attitudes than fam-
ily attitudes, religion, and political views. All
these factors, however, have contributed to some
extent to changes in attitudes toward divorce.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated in the analyses, an educational
crossover in divorce attitudes among young
women has clearly occurred between 1974 and
2002. An important social implication of this
finding is that in contrast to the 1970s, divorce
attitudes now correlate with divorce behavior at
the macrolevel. Highly educated women, who
traditionally had the lowest divorce rates, now
also have the most restrictive attitudes toward
divorce, suggesting that the link between atti-
tudes and behavior may be strengthening.
Although our findings suggest that divorce
attitudes and divorce behavior are becoming
more strongly linked at the aggregate level, the
causal order of that link is not clear. On the one
hand, broad shifts in social values account for
little of the specific shifts in divorce attitudes
across educational groups. On the other hand,
high incomes and occupational prestige (more
common among college graduates) are becom-
ing strong predictors of restrictive attitudes
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toward divorce, whereas (usually less educated)
women who are single mothers, divorced, or
separated consistently have the most permissive
attitudes toward divorce.
Our interpretation of the multivariate models
is that divorce attitudes are complexly related to
the expected utility of divorce. Highly educated
women’s decreasing uncertainty about stable
marriages lowers the personal salience of divorce
for them. Furthermore, increases in economic
and social inequality have made uncertainty
about marriage more salient for the middle and
lower educational groups. The reader should be
cautioned, however, that this interpretation is
largely conjectural. We have estimated no for-
mal statistics to prove that the observed differ-
ences between the model with social values
variables and the model with work and family
structure variables are statistically significant. In
addition, the variables in the multivariate analy-
sis could be conceptualized in ways other than
those we described.
Consistent with Blankenhorn’s (2002) con-
jecture, we find that highly educated women are
adopting restrictive attitudes toward divorce in
American society. We also agree that changing
attitudes toward divorce might also be reducing
divorce rates for those groups of women who
are adopting more restrictive attitudes toward
divorce. Furthermore, this top educational stra-
tum can have a disproportionate ability to
promote family change by shaping laws or
influencing the social acceptability of divorce,
compared to those in the middle educational
levels who are more ambivalent about the avail-
ability of divorce, or disadvantaged groups at
the lowest education levels who clearly want
divorce to remain accessible.
The recent passage of covenant marriage
laws in some states (Sanchez, Nock, Wright, &
Gager, 2002), along with other proposals for
increasing marital commitment (cf., Scott,
2000), are all consistent with the idea that indi-
viduals (or at least those who are able to affect
public policy) are indeed starting to ‘‘change
their minds’’ about divorce. We do not expect
policies promoting commitment to marriage,
however, to necessarily change attitudes toward
divorce. It is difficult to imagine poor, em-
ployed single mothers changing their attitudes
about divorce in the absence of significant im-
provements in their marriage opportunities. In-
stead, our findings suggest a more pessimistic
outlook: Increasing women’s labor force
involvement, along with diverging family out-
comes, are contributing to a growing social and
attitudinal divide between the ‘‘haves’’ who
experience a diminishing probability of entering
and the ‘‘have-nots’’ who face a relatively high
and increasing probability of entering an uncer-
tain marriage.
In summary, we do not mean to imply that
attitudes favoring permanent marriage among
college graduates are socially undesirable. This
is clearly a welcome trend to the extent that it
strengthens marriages for families with highly
educated parents. If a low probability of divorce
reduces the personal salience of divorce for col-
lege graduates, however, they might increas-
ingly view divorce and its attendant hardships
TABLE 4. DECOMPOSITION OF EDUCATION 3 YEAR INTERACTION COEFFICIENTS FROM MODELS IN TABLE 3
Four-Year College Degree
Versus High School Diploma
or Some College
No High School Diploma Versus
High School Diploma
or Some College
Education 3 Year coefficient (from Model A) 0.034 0.034
Odds ratio across education
and time span: more restrictive
versus less restrictive attitudes
toward divorce, 2000/1976
2.26 0.45
Percent odds ratio predicted by social
values variables in Model B
22 11
Work and family structure
variables in Model C (%)
51 30
Total percent odds ratio predicted
by all variables (Model D)
73 41
Note: GSSs for 1974–2002. N ¼ 4,999.
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as a social problem caused by other people’s
behavior. If this occurs, trends in divorce atti-
tudes could exacerbate family inequalities and
sharpen class delineations in the ‘‘culture wars’’
over the future of families.
NOTE
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2003
annual meetings of the American Sociological Association.
We gratefully acknowledge research funding from a Russell
Sage Foundation Grant on the Consequences of Social
Inequality for Families, Schools, and Communities. We also
thank Melissa Milkie and Suzanne Bianchi for their helpful
comments.
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